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LAND USE REGULATION
FOR AESTHETIC PURPOSES
For many years the efforts of
communities to eliminate or control
visual pollution were hampered by the
courts, which consistently refused to

uphold any regulation of land based

purely on aesthetic considerations.
Although the courts generally
sympathized with a locality's goal of
creating beautiful neighborhoods, they
noted that beauty is a subjective concept,
and that the formulation of precise

aesthetic standards is impossible because
tastes vary from individual to individual.

Courts were reluctant to validate
legislation which limited property rights
by the application of subjective
aesthetic standards.
See, e.g., West
Brothers Brick Co. v. Alexandria, DO Va.
271, 192 S.E. 681 (1937), appeal

dismissed 302 U.S. 658 (19 37-

In 1954, however, this view of
aesthetic regulation was implicitly

rejected by the United States Supreme
Court. In Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954), a case involving the exercise of
eminent domain in a slum clearance project
in the District of Columbia, Justice
Douglas wrote for a unanimous Court that
The concept of the public
welfare is broad and inclusive.
The values it represents are

spiritual as well as physical,

aesthetic as well as monetary.
It is within the power of the
legislature to determine that
the community should be beautiful
as well as healthy, spacious as
well as clean. . . . If those
who govern the District of
Columbia decide that the Nation's
capitol should be beautiful as
well as sanitary, there is
nothing in the Fifth Amendment
that stands in the way. Id. at 33.

Although the Berman case did not
deal specifically 7=-eethetic
regulation, the Supreme Court's words
provided the impetus for a new direction
in state court decisions. The first
state to uphold a regulation with a
purely aesthetic purpose was New York,
in the landmark decision of People v.
Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734
191".E.2d 272 (1963), a
dismissed
375 U.s. 42 (1963). In Stover, the City
of Rye, N.Y. had enacted-aordinance
prohibiting clotheslines in front yards
of residential areas. The New York
Court of Appeals upheld the ordinance,
noting that aesthetics is a valid
subject of legislative concern, and
that reasonable legislation designed to
promote that end is a valid and
permissible exercise of the police
power: "It is settled that conduct
which is similarly offensive to the
senses of hearing and smell may be a
valid subject of regulation under the
police power, and we perceive no basis
for a different result merely because
the sense of sight is involved." 191
N.E.2d at 276.
In the last two decades, the clear
trend has been for courts to allow
regulations enacted for purely aesthetic
purposes. The Oregon Supreme Court, for
example, has upheld a zoning ordinance
which prohibited automobile junkyards in
a municipality, stating plainly that
"aesthetic considerations alone may
warrant an exercise of the police power."'
on Cit v. Hartke, 240 Or.
35, 49,
kOO 7
5,
(1965).
The court
explained that ",(this 'change in
attitude is a reflection of the refinement
of our tastes and the growing appreciation
of cultured values in a maturing society."
Id at 46, 4OO P.2d at 261. See also,

J'sper v. Commonwealth, 375
.-"09
(Ky. Ct. App. 19). New York has

extended its Stover principle to zoning
ordinances, upholng a ban on offpremise business signs. Cromwell v.
Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 279 N.Y.S.2d

~

N.E.2d 749 (1967).

The greatest number of recent cases
involving aesthetic regulation concern
ordinances limiting the size or height
of signs. For example, a series of cases
in Florida follow the principle that
aesthetic considerations are enough to
justify the exercise of police power in
this area. See, e.g., Stone v. CitZ of
Maitland, 44r-F.2d -(5th Cir. 1971);
Sunad, Inc. v. Sarasota, 122 So.2d 611
(Fla. 1960). The Michigan Supreme Court
has upheld sign regulation, stating that
"a community's aesthetic well-being can
contribute to urban man's psychological
and emotional stability." Sun Oil Co. v.
Madison Xeifhts, 41 Mich.App. 47, 53, 199
N.E.2 55 1972). Recent decisions in
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Hawaii, and
Mississippi have also recognized the
validity of sign regulation based solely
on aesthetics. John Donnelly & Son v.
Outdoor Advertising Bd., 339 N.E.2d 709
(Mass. 1975); Westfield Motor Sales Co.
v. Westfield, 129 N.J.Super. 5261 324
A.2d 113 (1974); State v. Diamond Motors,
Inc., 50 Haw.33, 429 P.2dd25 (1967);
Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v.
Roberts Enterprises, Inc., 304 So.2d 637
(Miss. 1974).
:A 'few courts have
recently
repudiated the concept of regulation for
aesthetic purposes. The Maryland Court
of Appeals struck down sign regulations
as invalid exercises of the police power
in 1973 and 1974. Baltimore v. Mano
Swartz. Inc., 268 Md. 79, 299 A.2d 728
(1973)I Mongomery County v. Citizens
Building & Loan Association Inc., 20
Md.App. 404, 316 A.2d 322 (1974).
In
1976, the Ohio Court of Appeals
acknowledged the modern trend, but stated
that "it is still the Ohio rule that
zoning restrictions for purely aesthetic
reasons are unconstitutional." Cit of
Euclid v. Fitzthum, 48 OhioApp.2d 29,
351 N.E.2d 402 (1976).
In 1975, in the case of Board of
Supervisors of James City Cout -7.owe,
216 Va. 126, 216 S.1.2d 199 11975), the
Virginia Supreme Court also declined to
follow the modern trend. At issue in the
case was a provision in the James City
County zoning ordinance which reauired
the owner of a parcel of land to obtain
approval from an architectural design
review board before proceeding with

construction on his land. The stated
purposes of the ordinance were "to
protect property values and to promote
the general welfare by insuring
buildings in good taste, proper
proportion, in general and reasonable
harmony with the existing buildings in
the surrounding area and to encourage
architecture which shall be distinct
from the Colonial Williamsburg
architecture." The court felt that
despite this language the predominant
purpose of the ordinance was to promote
aesthetic values, and held that the
"county cannot limit or restrict the
use which a person may make of his
property under the guise of its police
power where the exercise of such power
would be justified solely on aesthetic
considerations." 216 S.E.2d at 213

citing Kenyon Peck, Inc. v. Kennedy,
2

60, 16W S.E.2d 117 (1969).

It should be noted that practically
all jurisdictions are willing to uphold
aesthetic regulations if the ordinance
can be closely tied to some other
accepted police power objective, such
as promoting the general welfare by
protecting public health or safety.
Some courts are not hesitant to find
such other suitable purposes, but others,
such as Virginia, are reluctant to do
so. An example of a favorable attitude
toward aesthetic regulation in this
context occurred when the Eighth
Circuit, applying Minnesota law, upheld
an ordinance restricting construction
which would obstruct the view from a
St. Paul park on the basis that
preserving the view was essential to the
proper legislative goal of renovating
the core area of downtown St. Paul.
City of St. Paul v. Chicago, St. Paul,
Ma
.413 F.2d 762 (th Cir.
1969), cert deied, 396 U.S. 985.
Preservation ofproperty values is a
legitimate object of the police power
in most states, and thus aesthetic
regulation which achieves this goal is
generally upheld. See, e.g., State ex
rel. Saveland Park Nolding Corp. v.
Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217
M =er cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841;
State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458
S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970). Similarly, many
courts have validated ordinances which

are designed to protect historical or
architecturally significant districts.
There appears to be a broad concensus
that such preservation is a legitimate
object of aesthetic regulation. See,
e.g., City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-0 o, 73 N.M. 410, 309 P.2d 13 (1964);
City of New Orleans v. Impastato, 198
La. 206, 3 So.2d 559 (1941)1 City of
New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 6'VSo.
2id79U(1953i.
It appears likely that the modern
trend toward permitting land use
regulation based solely on aesthetic
grounds will prevail as the majority
rule. The United States Supreme Court
appears to be favorably inclined
towards the concept; moreover, the
admittedly subjective standards
required by aesthetic regulation seem
no more difficult to create than
others commonly contained in modern
planning and zoning ordinances.

